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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Labor law is an offspring of the social and political action of the 
working class movement. While this movement started its first re-
volts in seventeenth-century Europe, it was only capable of organiz-
ing itself in the nineteenth century when the old laws against combi-
nations were repealed.1 During this period, socialist ideologues pro-
vided the intellectual substratum for the movement to flourish.2 
Thus, in England, Robert Owen inspired the foundation of the Grand 
National Consolidated Trades Union in 1834, Ferdinand Lassalle 
founded the General German Workers’ Union in 1863, and the follow-
ing year Karl Marx was a chief actor in the creation of the Interna-
tional Working Men’s Association, usually called the First Interna-
tional.3 Governments conceded both democratic and labor law re-
forms under the pressure of uprisings, and toward the end of the cen-
tury, when working class parties and trade unions consolidated their 
power, labor and industrial legislation was an essential feature of 
European law.4 
 The emergence of American labor law was influenced by socialist 
ideas as well. It is worth quoting one of the leading experts in labor 
policies in the interwar period, Walton Hamilton, who served as the 
first U.S. representative to the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) in 1935: 
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 1. WOLFGANG ABENDROTH, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN WORKING CLASS 15 
(Nicholas Jacobs & Brian Trench trans., New Left Books 1972) (1965). 
 2. See id. at 15-26. 
 3. Id. at 16, 32-33, 40. 
 4. See id. at 41-50. 
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The wise organization of wage-earners, by keeping its personnel 
fairly intact, by imposing restrictions upon entrance to a trade, by 
using “collective bargaining” in the making of wage contracts, and 
by seizing the favorable moment for the presentation of its claims, 
can secure for its members higher wages than they could otherwise 
obtain.5  
 Hamilton advocated for a social reform agenda that included, 
among other things, the social control of business.6 Even if Hamilton 
was not an explicit supporter of Marxism, his socialist leanings are 
undisputable. In effect, Hamilton defended the socialization of corpo-
rate property:  
If scientific knowledge, discovery, and invention become “public 
property” after a term of years, there seems no reason why in-
vestments in the apparatus of production should not become the 
property of the community when those whose savings make them 
possible are fairly paid.7 
 Basically, labor law is a complex bundle of restraints on freedom 
of contract in the labor markets. According to Henry Farnam’s classi-
fication, such legislative measures fall into three different types: pro-
tective labor legislation, distributive legislation, and permissive legis-
lation.8 Protective legislation includes compulsory regulation of the 
labor contract such as child labor laws, maximum hours laws, and 
health and safety laws.9 Today, this type of legislation also encom-
passes the prohibition of sexual and moral harassment at work 
and nondiscrimination in recruitment and hiring. Distributive leg-
islation seeks to affect the terms of exchange; for example, compul-
sory payment in legal tender, minimum wage laws, control of wages, 
and retirement security. Compensation for arbitrary discharge is of-
ten regarded as a distributive measure, but it can also be taken as a 
piece of protective legislation if it seeks to guarantee fair and hu-
mane treatment in the workplace. Finally, permissive legislation fa-
cilitates the creation of institutions for concerted worker action, col-
lective bargaining, and labor arbitration.10 The National Labor Rela-
tions Acts (NLRA) of 1935, also known as the Wagner Act, is the 
typical example.11 To allow union action, these permissive measures 
are usually coupled with exemptions in other areas of law, like the 
permission of labor cartelization in antitrust law or the exemption of 
                                                                                                                     
 5. WALTON HAMILTON & STACY MAY, THE CONTROL OF WAGES 119 (1923). 
 6. Id. passim. 
 7. Id. at 68. 
 8. Charles W. McCurdy, The “Liberty of Contract” Regime in American Law, in THE 
STATE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 161, 190-91 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1998). 
 9. Id. at 190. 
 10. Id. at 191. 
 11. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-167 (2000). 
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union boycotts and picketing from tort law.12 For instance, the Nor-
ris-La Guardia Act of 1932 limited the jurisdiction of federal courts to 
issue injunctions in labor disputes and nonviolent strikes.13  
 The literature on the philosophical foundations of labor law is 
scant; the most interesting contributions appear in works that do not 
specifically address labor law, rather they address more general top-
ics in moral and political philosophy. In view of labor law’s roots in 
socialism, the paucity of contemporary philosophical works on labor 
law is surprising.14 In this Article I focus on philosophical arguments 
relevant to the justification of labor law institutions. Because some of 
these arguments are made in the course of more abstract philosophi-
cal discussions, they are often missing in the labor law literature. 
Thus, this Article has the additional goal of bridging the philosophi-
cal and the labor law literature. At times I also have to deal with 
economic works. In fact, while some philosophical arguments are in-
sensitive to economics issues, other arguments depend to a greater 
extent on economic assumptions; in the latter cases, a discussion of 
such assumptions is unavoidable.  
 This Article is organized around the discussion of five philosophi-
cal arguments: (1) the argument from positive freedom and real free-
dom, (2) the argument from equity and distributive justice, (3) the 
argument from noncommodification, (4) the argument from paternal-
ism, and (5) the argument from equal autonomy. I try to show that 
the first three arguments are defective in various ways. In contrast, 
the argument from paternalism and the argument from equal auton-
omy offer a sound theoretical approach to labor law. Both arguments 
can justify regulations that fall under the head of protective legisla-
tion. While the argument from paternalism can ground noncoercive 
regulation of the employment contract in order to prevent workers 
from committing systematic decisionmaking mistakes (for example, 
underestimating health risks), the argument from equal autonomy 
can justify nonprice compulsory terms that seek to protect workers as 
autonomous agents.  
 The approach to labor law developed in this Article is to some ex-
tent revisionist. Thus the approach shows that some labor law insti-
tutions are not necessarily warranted. For instance, compulsory col-
lective bargaining is not justifiable in competitive labor markets. Ac-
                                                                                                                     
 12. Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 13. WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 
158-66 (1991); Eileen Silverstein, Collective Action, Property Rights and Law Reform: The 
Story of the Labor Injunction, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 97, 108 (1993). 
 14. Though there are a few theoretically minded works on labor law, they generally 
discuss less philosophical arguments than economic and legal considerations. See generally 
FOUNDATIONS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (Samuel Estreicher & Stewart J. Schwab 
eds., 2000); A.C.L. DAVIES, PERSPECTIVES ON LABOUR LAW (2004); LABOUR RIGHTS AS 
HUMAN RIGHTS (Philip Alston ed., 2005).  
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cordingly, this view could be contested by claiming that it fails to jus-
tify the institutions that it recommends to revise. My reply is to point 
out that any piece of normative philosophy is to some extent revision-
ist. Therefore, the would-be critic should engage in a sustained ar-
gument to show that the discussion made in this Article is flawed. In 
the absence of such argument, the approach developed here should 
obviously guide labor law reform.15  
II.   THE ARGUMENT FROM FREEDOM 
A.   Positive Freedom 
 Labor law’s birth was easier in Europe than in America. In effect, 
during Reconstruction the ideology of free labor blocked legislative 
intrusion on the employment contract. Thus, laws establishing a le-
gal day’s labor of eight hours allowed contracting out, and courts 
scrutinized liability labor legislation more seriously than other regu-
lations of commerce. As McCurdy says, “The specialness of labor 
contract in American law was the product of a ‘free labor’ ideology 
that virtually all northerners—Republicans and Democrats, work-
ers and employers—regarded as an expression of the North’s dis-
tinctive social order from the 1840s through the 1870s.”16 
 According to McCurdy, the same ideology was influential in the 
Lochner-era, when the Supreme Court struck down compulsory maxi-
mum hours laws17 and legislation prohibiting yellow-dog contracts.18 At 
the same time, supporters of social legislation, like Richard Ely, de-
fended those laws on the basis of positive liberty and social justice.19  
 During the nineteenth century, British utilitarians favored the 
Hobbesian conception of liberty as absence of external interference. 
Thus, Jeremy Bentham endorsed a clearly negative conception of free-
dom: “All coercive laws, therefore . . . and in particular all laws crea-
tive of liberty, are, as far as they go, abrogative of liberty.”20 Positive 
liberty emerged as an alternative conception of freedom during the so-
cial reform debates in Britain. In fact, in the last decades of the cen-
tury neo-Hegelians started to espouse ideals of moral freedom, that is, 
moralized conceptions of positive freedom as self-realization and self-
fulfillment.21 T. H. Green was the main representative of this line of 
                                                                                                                     
 15. This is a philosophical Article. Therefore, I do not discuss the political economy of 
labor law reform. 
 16. McCurdy, supra note 8, at 167.  
 17. Id. at 179-80; see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 18. McCurdy, supra note 8, at 167; see Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). 
 19. McCurdy, supra note 8, at 180-81. 
 20. Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 
489, 503 (John Bowring ed., 1995). 
 21. For a helpful survey of these conceptions, see David Nicholls, Positive Liberty, 
1880-1914, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 114 (1962). 
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thought. In his Lecture on Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Con-
tract, Green defines positive liberty as an individual moral capacity:  
We shall probably all agree that freedom, rightly understood, is 
the greatest of blessings; that its attainment is the true end of all 
our effort as citizens. But when we thus speak of freedom, we 
should consider carefully what we mean by it. We do not mean 
merely freedom from restraint or compulsion. We do not mean 
merely freedom to do as we like irrespectively of what it is that we 
like. We do not mean a freedom that can be enjoyed by one man or 
one set of men at the cost of a loss of freedom to others. When we 
speak of freedom as something to be so highly prized, we mean a 
positive power or capacity of doing or enjoying something worth do-
ing or enjoying, and that, too, something that we do or enjoy in 
common with others. We mean by it a power which each man exer-
cises through the help or security given him by his fellow-men, and 
which he in turn helps to secure for them.22 
 Green takes positive liberty to be by necessity equally distributed 
and refuses “to ascribe the glory of freedom to a state in which the 
apparent elevation of the few is founded on the degradation of the 
many”; in this respect Green deems modern societies superior to the 
ancient republics.23 For Green, freedom of contract is instrumentally 
valuable to the “equal development of the faculties of all”: 
If I have given a true account of that freedom which forms the goal 
of social effort, we shall see that freedom of contract, freedom in all 
the forms of doing what one will with one’s own, is valuable only as 
a means to an end. That end is what I call freedom in the positive 
sense: in other words, the liberation of the powers of all men 
equally for contributions to a common good.24 
 Green accepts the economic proposition that labor is an exchange-
able commodity, but he claims that because it is a commodity so 
closely attached to “the person of man,” legal restrictions are needed 
to secure that labor contracts will not hinder workers to become “free 
contributors to social good.”25 There are various ways in which the 
employment contract can stand in the way of equal positive freedom:  
This is most plainly the case when a man bargains to work under 
conditions fatal to health, e.g., in an unventilated factory. Every 
injury to the health of the individual is, so far as it goes, a public 
injury. It is an impediment to the general freedom; so much deduc-
tion from our power, as members of society, to make the best of 
ourselves. Society is, therefore, plainly within its right when it lim-
                                                                                                                     
 22. T.H. Green, Lecture on Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract, in 3 WORKS 
OF THOMAS HILL GREEN 370-71 (R.L. Nettleship ed., 1891). 
 23. Id. at 372. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 373. 
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its freedom of contract for the sale of labor, so far as is done by our 
laws for the sanitary regulations of factories, workshops, and 
mines. It is equally within its right in prohibiting the labor of 
women and young persons beyond certain hours. If they work be-
yond those hours, the result is demonstrably physical deteriora-
tion; which, as demonstrably, carries with it a lowering of the 
moral forces of society. For the sake of that general freedom of its 
members to make the best of themselves, which it is the object of 
civil society to secure, a prohibition should be put by law, which is 
the deliberate voice of society, on all such contracts of service as in 
a general way yield such a result.26 
 Moralized conceptions of positive freedom, like Green’s, have a po-
tential for totalitarianism, as shown by Isaiah Berlin in his famous 
Two Concepts of Liberty.27 Though Berlin was committed to welfare 
liberalism, he opposed the ideal of positive freedom, particularly in 
its moralized, neo-Hegelian variant.28 Berlin tries to explain how a 
misguided defense of liberty can lead to the abolition of liberty, obvi-
ously having in mind the authoritarian experiences of Germany and 
Russia.29 Berlin notes that positive liberty is often a dangerous 
weapon in the hands of authoritarian regimes, because it suggests 
the idea of a self divided into two sides: a “higher or true self” and a 
“lower self,” with the former governing the latter.30 This makes it 
possible to claim that totalitarian coercion is not only congenial to 
liberty but also a necessary condition of it, so long as the coercion is 
addressed to the lower self as a means to achieve the full manifesta-
tion of the true self.31 Berlin is best understood as demarcating the 
proper place of liberty, as opposed to equality and other political val-
ues. In fact, he defends a pluralistic value theory, which warrants la-
bor and social legislation.32 Berlin’s criticism, leaving aside its meta-
physical overtones, boils down to a warning about the serious menace 
involved in granting, in the name of positive freedom, discretionary 
powers to government. 
 In contemporary political theory, a number of Marxists and liberals 
defend generally nonmoralized conceptions of positive freedom which 
could also be used to ground labor legislation.33 For these authors, 
freedom is either the possession of opportunities, options and powers, 
                                                                                                                     
 26. Id. 
 27. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969). 
 28. See id. passim. 
 29. Id. at 119. 
 30. Id. at 132. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 171. 
 33. See, e.g., LAWRENCE CROCKER, POSITIVE LIBERTY: AN ESSAY IN NORMATIVE 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1980); ALAN GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON JUSTIFICATION 
AND APPLICATIONS (1982); C.B. MACPHERSON, Berlin’s Division of Liberty, in DEMOCRATIC 
THEORY: ESSAYS IN RETRIEVAL 95 (1973). 
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or the actual exercise of those powers. Similarly, Amartya Sen argues 
that well-being should be understood as a set of substantive freedoms 
or “capabilities.”34 He avails himself of the concept of “functionings,” 
the various things a person may have a reason to be or do.35 Freedom 
as capability connotes the idea of a range of options, or “alternative 
combinations of functionings,” that a person can achieve.36 Focusing on 
labor rights, Simon Deakin has recently argued that Sen’s capability 
approach may “provide us with a normative framework of point of ref-
erence from which to compare different proposals.”37 Deakin contends 
that social rights, as much as civil and political rights, are institutions 
created to enhance citizens’ capabilities.38  
 Unlike Green’s moralized conception of freedom, the capabilities 
approach is basically a public policy position, and its claim to ground 
labor legislation relies on empirical propositions. However, the capa-
bilities justification of labor law is a nonstarter as a philosophical the-
ory, because it attaches decisive importance to economic consequences. 
Now it is a contingent matter whether labor legislation enhances posi-
tive freedom or rather reduces it. For instance, a minimum wage law 
might reduce workers’ capabilities by augmenting unemployment. The 
notion of capabilities is too broad to identify our fundamental concerns 
in labor law, because it encompasses most economic consequences. 
What we need is a philosophical approach to labor law capable of 
showing that, even if a piece of labor legislation is detrimental to wel-
fare or capabilities, it still deserves our allegiance.  
B.   Real Freedom 
 Though there are various philosophical doctrines about the moral 
basis of contractual obligation, it is widely accepted that contracts are 
binding (only) if they are voluntarily (freely) consented to.39 Accord-
ingly, law establishes coercive threats and economic duress as reasons 
that exclude voluntariness.40 Because an employment contract typi-
cally begins with an employer’s offer, there seems to be no coercion in-
volved in this contract. Although both threats and offers can have mo-
                                                                                                                     
 34. Amartya Sen, Capability and Well Being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30, 30 (Martha 
Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993). 
 35. Id. at 31. 
 36. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 75-76 (1999); AMARTYA SEN, THE 
STANDARD OF LIVING (Geoffrey Hawthorne ed., 1987); Sen, supra note 34, at 31; Amartya 
Sen, Well-Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984, 82 J. PHIL. 169 passim 
(1985). 
 37. Simon Deakin, Social Rights in a Globalized Economy, in LABOUR RIGHTS AS HU-
MAN RIGHTS, supra note 14, at 59. 
 38. Id. 
 39. JEFFREY FERRIELL & MICHAEL NAVIN, UNDERSTANDING CONTRACTS § 12.04, at 
519-20 (2004). 
 40. Id. at 529-30, 533-36. 
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tivational influence on the agent, there is a fundamental difference be-
tween threats and offers. While a threat diminishes the victim’s range 
of options, an offer enhances this range.41 Employment offers seem to 
be exempt from any charge of coerciveness because they enhance 
workers’ menus of options. But things are not so simple. There are of-
fers that narrow the offeree’s range of options; some of them are coer-
cive, others are not. Charles Fried gives a clear pair of cases: 
[Case A:] A student pianist who has given free annual recitals in 
his village church for several years announces that henceforth he 
will require a fee. 
[Case B:] An enterprising journalist discovers that a professor of 
moral philosophy was convicted of embezzlement years ago. He pro-
poses to publish this fact in a review of the professor’s new book, 
unless the professor promises to pay him several thousand dollars.42 
 Fried argues that the only way to characterize coercive proposals 
is by appealing to a moral criterion.43 Thus, he says that a proposal is 
not coercive if it offers what the proponent has a right to offer or not 
as he chooses.44 It is coercive if it proposes a wrong; otherwise it is 
noncoercive.45 Thus, the pianist’s proposal is noncoercive, while the 
journalist’s proposal is coercive. 
 From a legal standpoint, labor offers do not violate workers’ 
rights, and therefore, they should be considered noncoercive. But 
consider a case of economic duress, also proposed by Fried: 
[Case C:] A small contractor specializing in exterior repairs offers 
jobs at low wages to young men in a time of high unemployment. 
He explains that the work is dangerous and that he has limited 
safety equipment and limited insurance coverage. Each employee 
signs an undertaking to accept the full risk of the work and under 
no circumstances to sue for injuries.46 
 This is not only a fictional case. In fact, disclaim of compensation 
for injuries was common in railroad labor contracts when the first 
employers’ liability laws abrogated the fellow servant rule. Some le-
gal scholars would consider the contractor’s job offer as coercive. The 
political philosopher Gerald Cohen maintains the same position. He 
holds that when the employee has no reasonable or acceptable alter-
native to taking a hazardous job, he is forced to do so.47 Cohen, in 
                                                                                                                     
 41. HORACIO SPECTOR, AUTONOMY AND RIGHTS 18 (1992). 
 42. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 96 (1981). 
 43. Id. at 96-98. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 104. 
 47. G.A. COHEN, Are Disadvantaged Workers Who Take Hazardous Jobs Forced to 
Take Hazardous Jobs?, in HISTORY, LABOUR, AND FREEDOM: THEMES FROM MARX 239, 241-
42 (1988). 
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fact, maintains a more general thesis, namely, that all job offers un-
der capitalism are coercive because proletarians, considered collec-
tively, are not free to leave the working class and become private 
owners of capital.48 Following Marx, Cohen argues that, just as slaves 
and feudal serfs, proletarians are forced to sell their labor force to 
capitalists through labor contracts.49 Against this background, labor 
law could have the remedial and transitional function—while capital-
ism persists—to ameliorate the worst effects of what Cohen calls 
“proletarian unfreedom.”50  
 Robert Nozick denies that workers who take the least attractive 
jobs do so under coercion.51 He gives a fancy example.52 Suppose there 
are twenty-six women and twenty-six men, each wanting to be mar-
ried. Call the women A to Z and the men A′ to Z′. In each sex group, 
these people share their preferences. All women prefer A′ to B′, B′ to 
C′, and so on, and all men prefer A to B, B to C, and so on. Suppose 
all proceed to choose partners until we remain with Z and Z′, who by 
the other twenty-five’s choices have only one choice: marrying the 
other or remain unmarried. If they finally marry, is the marriage un-
free? Despite the harsh conditions Z and Z′ face, Nozick claims that 
the marriage is voluntary, because the other twenty-five have acted 
within their rights. Similarly, says Nozick, if worker Z is confronted 
with the choice of working or starving and chooses to work, he works 
voluntarily. Although he lacks a more attractive alternative, the nar-
rowing of options has resulted from other people legitimately exercis-
ing their rights.  
 Both Fried and Nozick defend a moralized account of coercion. This 
account implies that labor contracts are voluntary even if workers 
have no other palatable alternative. Cohen rejects this view by arguing 
that it implies that a criminal in prison, if imprisonment is justifiable, 
is not forced to be in prison.53 This is counterintuitive. But even if the 
use of physical force is, by definition, a form of coercion, we would not 
say that an attorney makes a coercive offer if he offers a criminal to re-
lease him on bail on condition that he enters a plea of guilty.54 So I do 
not think Cohen’s example rebuts the Nozick-Fried analysis of coer-
                                                                                                                     
 48. G.A. Cohen, The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3  pas-
sim (1983). 
 49. See G.A. COHEN, Labour Theory of Value and the Concept of Exploitation, in HIS-
TORY, LABOUR, AND FREEDOM, supra note 47, at 209, 233-35.  
 50.  G.A. COHEN, The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom, in HISTORY, LABOUR, AND 
FREEDOM, supra note 47, at 255, 255-85. 
 51. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 262 (1974).  
 52. See id. at 263-64.  
 53. Cohen, supra note 48, at 4. For a criticism of Cohen’s argument, see JOHN GRAY, 
Against Cohen on Proletarian Unfreedom, in POSTLIBERALISM: STUDIES IN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT 123 (1993). 
 54. For an excellent discussion of coercion, see ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987). 
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cion. In fact, Marxists need not adopt a neutral, nonmoralized defini-
tion of coercion to maintain that labor offers are coercive. Under Marx-
ism private property of the means of production is morally indefensi-
ble.55 If employers do not possess a right to control the means of pro-
duction or a right to control the profits arising out of the exclusive con-
trol of such means, the labor offers they make to propertyless workers 
are coercive. The coerciveness of labor offers then turns on the under-
lying theory of moral entitlements one adopts.  
 When the Marxian argument that labor contracts are coercive re-
flects a general indictment of capitalist law, it proves too much for 
our purposes. It does not really justify labor law, but rather the total 
abolition of private property and private contracts. So there are good 
reasons for rejecting a comprehensive account from duress. Of course, 
there is no denying the fact that some labor offers, made under spe-
cial conditions like Fried’s small contractor example, are coercive. Ac-
cording to the moralized criterion of coercion, to assert this we might 
say, for instance, that a worker has an inalienable right to obtain 
compensation for negligent injuries. But once we have accepted this 
analysis, the role of coercion gets blurred. First, if the contract is co-
ercive, why should we not declare it null and void? This would be the 
natural response for an involuntary contract. Second, if the moral ob-
jection against the contract is that it violates the worker’s inalienable 
right to compensation for negligent injuries, it seems that other con-
tracts, made in the presence of more alternatives of choice, would 
also be objectionable. This shows that, though particular contracts 
can be attacked as coercive, under a moralized account of coercion the 
real work is done by the moral principles bolstering the account. 
Therefore, the harsh conditions surrounding the small contractor’s 
transaction can explain why the worker is prepared to accept such a 
grievous contract, but they do not constitute the reason why the con-
tract is unconscionable. The reason should be looked for elsewhere.  
III.   THE ARGUMENT FROM EQUITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
 It seems natural to view labor law as a weapon of the working 
class in its struggle to obtain the full value of its contribution to the 
social product. This socialist portrayal of labor law is optimistic be-
cause it regards labor law as an attempt to alleviate the exploitative 
character of capitalism. But there is also a cynical socialist concep-
tion of labor law. These socialists would rather take labor law as a 
strategic device adopted by the ruling classes and their political allies 
to calm down social discontent and appease the working class’s revo-
lutionary impetus. As is obvious, it is only the optimistic view that 
                                                                                                                     
 55. See COHEN, supra note 49, at 235. 
2006]       PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LABOR LAW 1129 
 
can possibly offer a justification of labor law; the cynical view is con-
temptuous of any form of justification.  
 Is there a plausible exploitation theory of labor law? In its tradi-
tional form, the Marxian argument about capitalist exploitation re-
lies on the labor theory of value.56 For Marx, value was an objective 
property of every commodity.57 Exchange value of commodities in the 
market is explained by their cost of production, what Marx called the 
“socially necessary labor time” to produce them.58 Labor itself has an 
exchange value (that is, the wage rate) explained by the amount of 
labor needed to “produce” the labor force.59 But laborers create 
greater value that is embodied in the commodities they produce and 
that explain their respective exchange value (that is, the price); this 
greater value is the surplus value.60 So, under capitalism, the amount 
of labor a worker expends in the productive process to earn his wage 
is greater than the amount of labor embodied in the goods he can 
purchase with his wage.61 For Cohen, this transfer of value from 
workers to capitalists constitutes exploitation, because greater value 
is exchanged for lesser value. Cohen has stated this argument in this 
way: 
 (1) Labor and labor alone creates value. 
 (2) The laborer receives the value of his labor power. 
 (3) The value of the product is greater than the value of his 
  labor power. 
 (4) The laborer receives less value than he creates. 
 (5) The capitalist receives the remaining value. 
 (6)  The laborer is exploited by the capitalist.62 
 This argument is exposed to many objections. First, it is important 
to notice that the charge of exploitation has normative force only if 
we assume an ideal of equity condemning unequal exchange. Though 
some interpreters think that Marx eschewed a normative theory of 
justice, the use of exploitation to criticize capitalism and justify so-
cialism or interventions in the market must assume that exploitation 
is wrong or unjust. Even if Marxists do not endorse a theory of jus-
tice, they must hold some ideal of equity if the concept of exploitation 
is to serve a normative purpose. But the argument leaves unex-
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plained why, even if the capitalist expropriates the surplus, the labor 
contract involves unequal exchange. The capitalist pays a wage for 
the labor power, and this wage is, by hypothesis, equated with the 
value of the labor power. Because the laborer does not sell the prod-
uct but just his labor power, the fact that the product gives a surplus 
does not imply that the capitalist exploits the laborer. The existence 
of surplus is not inconsistent with equality of exchange holding be-
tween labor power and wage.  
 Another objection is that the argument assumes an absolute the-
ory of value that is inconsistent with mainstream neoclassical theory. 
As Robert Nozick persuasively puts it, “Marxian exploitation is the 
exploitation of people’s lack of understanding of economics.”63 He pro-
vides a simple example: Suppose a person works on something ab-
solutely useless that no one wants. For example, he spends hours 
efficiently making a big knot; no one else can do it more quickly. 
Will this object be valued by the hours invested?64 
 In neoclassical competitive equilibrium, workers are paid a wage 
that is equivalent to the value of the marginal product they produce. 
Since marginal productivity determines the price of labor, exploita-
tion can only occur when workers are not paid the full value of their 
marginal product.  
 In view of the demise of the labor theory of value, Marxists usu-
ally adopt one of two strategies: (a) they remove the idea of exploita-
tion from its preeminent place in Marxism, or (b) they try to show 
that exploitation can be understood without the labor theory of value. 
John Roemer adopts the first strategy.65 He claims that distributive 
injustice in the ownership of productive assets, rather than exploita-
tion, is the central concept for a contemporary construal of Marx-
ism.66 Cohen takes the second route. He argues that the exploitation 
argument can be premised on two obvious propositions:  
 (1′) The laborer creates the product, that which has value, and 
 (2′) The capitalist receives some of the value of the product.67 
 Unlike premise (1), (1′) does not presuppose the labor theory of 
value. This is true, but it is doubtful that the charge of unequal ex-
change can be made against the background of the neoclassical the-
ory of value. The laborer “creates,” or rather produces, a commodity 
and is paid the value of his marginal contribution measured at the 
commodity’s price. Why is this “unequal” exchange? On the other 
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hand, though the capitalist receives some of the value of the product, 
as premise (2′) says, this does not necessarily offend equity. As Israel 
Kirzner and N. Scott Arnold have argued, capitalist profits derive 
from investment decisions taken in environments of risk and uncer-
tainty.68 The capitalist’s contribution can take different forms: mana-
gerial functions, discovery of inefficiencies, entrepreneurial skills, 
and so on. While the capitalist as capitalist just brings in capital in 
the productive process but not labor, the capitalist is also an entre-
preneur whose productive resources must be rewarded in equity.  
 The exploitation argument can be best served by leaving Marx-
ian economics and turning to neoclassical accounts of exploitation. 
Exploitation has no place in competitive markets, because, in an 
ideal situation of perfect competition, the product demand curve 
and the labor supply curve are perfectly elastic; therefore, eco-
nomic agents have no power to fix prices or wage rates. Every 
producer can sell any quantity of a commodity at the competitive 
price, and every employer can hire labor at the competitive wage 
rate. However, the ability to set prices and wages, that is, bar-
gaining power, does exist in imperfectly competitive markets. 
Joan Robinson has discussed two main classes of labor exploita-
tion in her seminal book The Economics of Imperfect Competi-
tion.69 Robinson distinguishes these classes as arising out of (1) 
monopoly conditions in the market for the product and (2) imper-
fections in the labor market.70 Robinson calls the former “monopo-
listic exploitation,” and the latter “monopsonistic exploitation.”71 
Monopolistic exploitation occurs because, under monopoly condi-
tions, the marginal revenue is (not equal to but) less than the 
price, because the firm cannot discriminate prices and, conse-
quently, must lower the price across all its production to sell more 
units.72 This means that a worker produces an additional unit 
whose (new) price is greater than the marginal revenue this unit 
generates. Since the wage is determined by the marginal revenue 
(not by the price), workers are paid a wage that is less than the 
value of their marginal product.73  
 Monopsonistic exploitation typically occurs when there is a sin-
gle employer for a given labor input. In this case, the employer 
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confronts an upward-sloping labor supply curve, and therefore, he 
must pay higher wages to hire more workers.74 This means that 
the marginal cost of labor exceeds the wage rate. The employer 
will hire labor up to the point where the marginal revenue prod-
uct is equivalent to the marginal cost.75 Because the wage paid is 
less than the marginal revenue product, there is exploitation. In 
such a case, a minimum wage law can drive wage rates up and, at 
the same time, increase employment.76 
 John Kenneth Galbraith rejected technical notions of imperfect 
competition to understand unionization but nonetheless defended 
trade unions in industrial capitalism along Robinsonian lines. For 
Galbraith, workers’ associations can operate as “countervailing pow-
ers.”77 This means that trade unions can be a proxy for economic 
competition under conditions of market power in order to restrain 
corporate power. Focusing on the American steel industry, Galbraith 
argued, “The economic power that the worker faced in the sale of his 
labor—the competition of many sellers dealing with few buyers—
made it necessary that he organize for his own protection.”78  
 Galbraith’s case for trade unions—for example, the United 
Steel Workers—could be reinterpreted as the view that, under 
monopsonistic conditions, collective bargaining is needed on 
grounds of fairness in order to reduce the surplus extracted from 
wage laborers. Because collective bargaining corrects the inequal-
ity of bargaining power between employers and workers, it is 
natural to think that union legislation facilitates a more fair dis-
tribution of the labor surplus. But even if unionization can pro-
mote bargaining equity, it may be counterproductive in terms of 
overall distributive justice. As is well known, union legislation al-
lows the creation of cartels that monopolize labor and raise its 
price. In fact, as Mancur Olson argues, unions will typically keep 
wages above competitive levels by preventing mutually advanta-
geous transactions between the involuntary unemployed and em-
ployers.79 Because trade unions bring about wage inflexibility, 
they cause unemployment when drops in demand occur. This will 
probably damage the allocation of resources and social justice. 
Other negative effects are worth considering. Wage stickiness can 
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aggravate or accelerate economic crises, a usually tragic outcome 
from a social justice stance. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky 
have noted a psychological asymmetry: losses are more aversive 
than objectively equivalent foregone gains.80 Under certain condi-
tions, this asymmetry can exacerbate wage stickiness induced by 
unions. Biased by the aversion to workers’ losses, unions can ef-
fectively block nominal wage cuts even when this is indispensable 
to avert an economic cataclysm that will cause far more serious 
decreases of real wages, both for unionized and nonunionized 
workers. The Argentine megacrisis in 2001 illustrates this point.  
 It might be thought that inequality of bargaining power can also 
prevent workers from obtaining fair contract terms, such as health 
and safety conditions or protection against wrongful discharge. The 
point would be that such terms could not be agreed on voluntarily 
by employers and employees because employers have greater bar-
gaining power than employees. Unequal bargaining power could 
also warrant regulation of the employment contract. But, as Dun-
can Kennedy argues, “even a monopolist has an interest in provid-
ing contract terms if buyers will pay him their cost, plus as much in 
profit as he can make for alternate uses of his capital.”81 Monopo-
lists do not affect contract terms but adjust quantity and price. Ac-
cordingly, asymmetrical bargaining power does not prevent the free 
negotiation of any term or condition that the employee is prepared 
to pay for. Ian Ayres and Stewart Schwab extend this thesis to the 
labor monopsonist: “[I]n a well functioning employment market, 
employers will provide all benefits and protections that employees 
are willing to pay for.”82 Therefore, the argument of unequal bar-
gaining power cannot justify nonprice compulsory terms in em-
ployment contracts. While monopsony-related considerations can 
justify wage regulations, they are irrelevant for justifying regula-
tion of employment contract terms. 
 The extent to which Robinson’s or Galbraith’s models describe 
real markets is an empirical question. Economists generally claim 
that, in the absence of legal restrictions, that is, when there are 
no barriers to entry, monopolies are unable to survive market 
forces in the long run. The monopsony model’s ability to replicate 
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real markets is more difficult to assess. Labor economists disagree 
in their understanding of labor markets in contemporary devel-
oped economies. While most of them usually resort to the competi-
tive model or noncompetitive “matching” models, Alan Manning 
has recently maintained that the labor supply curve to firms is 
generally inelastic. Manning claims that firms typically set wages 
and that the monopsonistic model should be substituted for more 
sophisticated “matching” models to explain several features of la-
bor markets.83  
 Employers and employees often face high rehiring and reloca-
tion costs, respectively. When this occurs, the situation can be 
analyzed as a bilateral monopoly, which gives rise to a negotiation 
surplus to be divided between both parties. Richard Epstein has 
analyzed this particular problem.84 Given the bilateral monopoly, 
it might be thought that, under the contract at will, the employer 
will appropriate most of the surplus in the negotiations. This 
might provide a theoretical case for labor regulation. However, 
Epstein claims that this distributional concern has a very limited 
scope, because the employee cannot be driven below the competi-
tive wage; the only question is, How much of a supracompetitive 
wage the worker will appropriate? Epstein argues that the social 
costs of any measure adopted to correct the distribution of the 
transactional surplus will be greater than the size of the surplus.85  
 The above points show that while trade union legislation can 
contribute to bargaining equity in noncompetitive labor markets, it 
can also affect social justice under some plausible conceptions of so-
cial justice. Take Rawls’s theory of justice as an example. Rawls 
states that economic inequalities can only be justified if they work 
to the advantage of the worst off.86 Under Rawls’s theory, individual 
shares are expressed in terms of primary goods, defined as goods 
that are needed for implementing any conception of the good life.87 
Now, in terms of two of Rawls’s primary goods, income and self-
esteem, the unemployed are the worst off. Given the economic ef-
fects of cartelization in the labor market, union legislation may be 
unjustifiable in accordance with Rawls’s theory of justice. 
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 A similar argument applies to wage regulations. Anthony 
Kronman argues that any system of contract law requiring volun-
tariness for the enforceability of contracts underwrites a form of 
distributive justice because it discriminates between rightful and 
wrongful forms of advantage-taking.88 As against Rawls, who ex-
cludes the regulation of individual transactions from the scope of 
distributive justice, Kronman claims that contract law rules, in-
cluding those governing employment contracts, should be de-
signed to accomplish redistribution of wealth as required by our 
principles of justice.89 Thus he says, “Minimum wage laws . . . at-
tempt to insure a fair distribution of wealth between workers and 
employers by specifying, in part, the terms on which workers may 
contract to sell their labor.”90 As said above, when the labor sup-
ply curve is less than perfectly elastic, a minimum wage law can 
promote bargaining equity. But this does not imply that minimum 
wage laws are generally effective to achieve social justice, for in-
stance, by benefiting the worst off.   
 The exact consequences of minimum wage laws for social jus-
tice remain uncertain. For instance, Michael Trebilcock has ar-
gued that minimum wage laws are not able to affect the overall 
balance of advantage between workers and employers.91 For him, 
both in competitive and monopolistic contexts, those laws are 
likely to harm workers.92 In fact, if the minimum wage exceeds the 
competitive wage, it will cause unemployment. This is anything 
but a novel proposition in economics. As John Stuart Mill states in 
Principles of Political Economy, “It is nothing to fix a minimum of 
wages, unless there be a provision that work, or wages at least, be 
found for all who apply for it.”93 Mill adds, “These consequences 
have been so often and so clearly pointed out by authors of reputa-
tion, in writings known and accessible, that ignorance of them on 
the part of educated persons is no longer pardonable.”94    
 Undoubtedly, labor law can be viewed as an attempt to redis-
tribute wealth in accordance with some ideal of social justice. 
While under special monopsonistic conditions, union legislation 
and minimum wage laws can ameliorate the effects of unequal 
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bargaining power and so promote bargaining equity, these meas-
ures are generally detrimental to overall social justice. There is 
little doubt that, given a conflict between bargaining equity and 
social justice, the latter should prevail. We can conclude that bar-
gaining equity is either unable to justify some labor law institu-
tions (Farnam’s “protective legislation”) or comes into conflict with 
social justice when the justification of other institutions is at 
stake (“distributive legislation” and “permissive legislation”).  
IV.   THE ARGUMENT FROM NONCOMMODIFICATION 
 The basic idea that certain goods are not tradable goes back to 
Kant: “In the kingdom of ends everything has either a price or a 
dignity. Whatever has a price can be replaced by something else 
as equivalent. Whatever by contrast is exalted above all price and 
so admits of no equivalent has a dignity.”95 
 If certain goods do not have an exchange equivalent, that is, a 
price, they are not a commodity. Is labor a commodity? The Clayton 
Act of 1914 declared that “the labor of a human being is not a com-
modity or article of commerce.”96 After the First World War, the prin-
ciple that labor is not a commodity also became part of the Labor 
Charter of the Treaty of Versailles.97 According to David Beatty, labor 
is not a commodity because, apart from its productive functions, it 
gives persons a sense of identity and meaning, allowing them to se-
cure their self-respect and self-esteem.98 Thus, Beatty opposes the 
common law rule that an employment contract can unilaterally be 
terminated by the employer with reasonable notice.99 This rule fails 
to capture the personal dimension of labor. To prevent the contrac-
tual commodification of labor, labor law should forbid dismissal with-
out just cause. 
 Even though the main elements of the noncommodification con-
ception of labor law were already present in Beatty’s essay, it was 
Margaret Jane Radin who placed this conception within a general 
theory of noncommodification in law.100 Radin claims that some goods 
should not be separated from persons through market trading.101 The 
reason is that those goods should not be treated as commodities.102 
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For instance, Richard Titmuss argued that human blood should not 
be allocated through the market.103 According to Radin, noncommodi-
fication is the moral foundation of market inalienability.104 She dis-
tinguishes between complete and incomplete noncommodification.105 
Some things, like consumer products, are completely commodified. 
Others, like babies, are completely noncommodified. And many 
things are incompletely commodified, because they are to some ex-
tent within the market and to some extent outside the market.  
 Radin interprets labor law in terms of the idea of incomplete com-
modification: “Although work has not been fully decommodified, it is 
incompletely commodified through collective bargaining, minimum 
wage requirements, maximum hour limitations, health and safety 
requirements, unemployment insurance, retirement benefits, pro-
hibition of child labor, and antidiscrimination requirements.”106 
 Radin thinks that labor law’s point is to avoid the harm to human 
personhood caused by the complete commodification of labor that 
would result from legalizing the contract at will. To sustain her con-
ception of labor, she inspires herself in Marx and Hegel. Thus, she 
quotes Marx saying: 
The worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity the more com-
modities he creates. With the increasing value of the world of 
things proceeds in direct proportion the devaluation of the world of 
men. Labour produces not only commodities; it produces itself and 
the worker as a commodity—and does so in the proportion in 
which it produces commodities generally.107 
 This Marxian statement echoes Kant’s distinction between price 
and dignity. Radin also quotes Hegel trying to justify wage labor as 
opposed to slavery: 
 Single products of my particular physical and mental skill and of 
my power to act I can alienate to someone else and I can give him 
the use of my abilities for a restricted period, because, on the 
strength of this restriction, my abilities acquire an external relation 
to the totality and universality of my being. By alienating the whole 
of my time, as crystallized in my work, and everything I produced, 
I would be making into another’s property the substance of my be-
ing, my universal activity and actuality, my personality.108 
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 Radin charges Hegel with confusing the internal/external distinc-
tion with the total/partial divide.109 Even when the worker does not 
sell all his capabilities, his capabilities are internal to him.110 Accord-
ing to Radin, Hegel recognizes the normative category of noncom-
mensuration but subordinates it to a market agenda that leads him 
to accept the externality of human labor.111  
 Is the argument from noncommensuration plausible? I will try to 
show that it must be rejected by noting how Elizabeth Anderson ap-
plies it to the particular case of commercial surrogate motherhood.112 
Deploying the principle that women’s labor is not a commodity, 
Anderson claims that there is an “unconscionable commodification” of 
women’s reproductive capacities in commercial surrogacy.113 One of 
Anderson’s statements is very illustrative of her general position: 
“Treating women’s labor as just another kind of commercial produc-
tion process violates the precious emotional ties which the mother 
may rightly and properly establish with her ‘product,’ the child, and 
thereby violates her claims to consideration.”114  
 What are the legal implications of Anderson’s commodification view 
of surrogate motherhood? She begins, “At the very least, surrogate 
contracts should not be enforceable.”115 The parallel conclusions with 
respect to employment contracts would be: “Employment contracts 
should not be enforceable.” But Anderson does not content herself with 
unenforceability. She goes on, “I think these arguments support the 
stronger conclusion that commercial surrogate contracts should be il-
legal, and that surrogate agencies who arrange such contracts should 
be subject to criminal penalties.”116 By the same token, employment 
contracts should be illegal and corporations trying to hire employees 
should be criminally prosecuted. Instead of a justification of labor law, 
the argument supports criminalization of wage labor.  
 It could be replied that, unlike surrogate motherhood, labor is only 
partially commodified. However, Radin makes it clear that inaliena-
bility is a strategy for eliminating markets.117 Incomplete commodifi-
cation is not justified by itself, but rather because of its possible dom-
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ino effect.118 Therefore, the argument from noncommodification can-
not give a principled justification of labor law.  
 However, suppose, for the sake of argument, that labor deserves to 
be partially commodified. Is this better? Now the problem is that 
there is no systematic correlation between degrees of commodifica-
tion and degrees of restraint on freedom of contract. At the extremes 
the correlation is clear. Just as complete commodification is corre-
lated with contractual freedom, criminal prohibition is the counter-
part of complete noncommodification. But we lack a criterion to 
match “partial commodification” with any specific form of labor regu-
lation. For instance, how should we match partial commodification 
with minimum wages? If price is not an adequate response for labor, 
do we get it better by fixing the price by law?  
V.   THE ARGUMENT FROM PATERNALISM 
 John Stuart Mill contended in On Liberty that people should be 
left legally free to lead their lives as they see fit as long as they do not 
harm others.119 This tenet is at the core of liberalism. Thus, paternal-
ism is often regarded as inimical to individual autonomy and free 
choice. However, Mill was aware that some forms of paternalism can 
be reconciled with the principle of free choice. For instance, Mill said 
that preventing a person from crossing an unsafe bridge does not 
constitute paternalistic interference, because the person, if consulted, 
would surely consent to being impeded from risking his life.120 More 
generally, Mill held that some kinds of government interference with 
individuals’ choices are taken for the individuals’ good without det-
riment to individual liberty.121 Maximum hours legislation is one ex-
ample. Mill says that such measures are “required, not to overrule 
the judgment of individuals respecting their own interest, but to give 
effect to that judgment: they being unable to give effect to it except 
by concert, which concert again cannot be effectual unless it receives 
validity and sanction from the law.”122 In contemporary economic jar-
gon, such interventions are addressed to avoid collective action prob-
lems. Such problems typically arise in prisoner’s dilemma situa-
tions.123 Mill mentions for illustration laws diminishing the hours of 
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labor.124 Obviously, the legal diminution of labor hours has public 
good properties in relation to the group of actual wage workers.  
 Government interventions addressed to correct disharmonies be-
tween individual and collective rationality in prisoner’s dilemma 
situations do not convey an insulting or humiliating message. When 
government compels an individual to follow an efficiency-enhancing 
rule, it does not say, “My judgment is superior to yours,” but rather 
something like, “According to widely accepted social science, in the 
absence of government intervention, individual rational agents will 
follow strategies that impair their individual preferences as they see 
them.” It is not on the assumption of irrationality or lack of compe-
tence that government takes these measures, but rather on the as-
sumption that individuals are fully rational. Simply because indi-
viduals act in accordance with the postulates of individual rational-
ity, they will sometimes fail to achieve those outcomes that are ra-
tional from a collective perspective. 
 Mill’s view of justifiable paternalism relies on a mismatch be-
tween individual and group rationality, but a generalized argument 
based on the limitations of human rationality might ground other 
benign forms of paternalism. Gerald Dworkin famously suggested 
that “paternalistic” interventions can be defended on the basis of sys-
tematic limitations of our cognitive and emotional capacities.125 He 
gives the example of Odysseus’s choice to be tied to the mast, which 
was based on his prediction that he would otherwise yield to the Si-
rens’ singing.126 We can contrast Dworkin’s view with Mill’s by using 
economic notions. While Mill was concerned about prisoner’s di-
lemma, failure of individual rationality, Dworkin seeks to ground 
some paternalist interventions on what Herbert Simon termed 
“bounded rationality.”127 Like Mill’s view, Dworkin’s account of pa-
ternalism is not inconsistent with the principles of liberalism because 
it appeals to consent: “Under certain conditions, it is rational for in-
dividuals to agree that others should force them to act in ways that, 
at the time of action, the individuals may not see as desirable.”128 
Dworkin suggests a “hypothetical consent” test to evaluate “paternal-
ist” interferences: 
 I suggest that since we are all aware of our irrational propensi-
ties—deficiencies in cognitive and emotional capacities and avoid-
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able and unavoidable ignorance—it is rational and prudent for us 
to take out “social insurance policies.” We may argue for and 
against proposed paternalistic measures in terms of what fully ra-
tional individuals would accept as forms of protection.129 
 Dworkin’s test relies on “individualized hypothetical consent.”130 
What the test requires is a counterfactual inquiry, to what the inter-
fered-with agent would have consented. One difficult issue is to select 
the group of choices on which paternalistic restrictions can be justi-
fied by appealing to hypothetical rational consent: “I suggest we 
think of the imposition of paternalistic interferences in situations of 
this kind as being a kind of insurance policy that we take out against 
making decisions that are far-reaching, potentially dangerous, and 
irreversible.”131 Thus, labor contracts that compromise laborers’ 
health and safety can be subject to paternalistic regulation. On this 
view, paternalistic labor legislation does not oppose autonomous 
choices. On the contrary, hypothetical rational consent would only 
sanction autonomy-enhancing restrictions: “I suggest that we would 
be most likely to consent to paternalism in those instances in which 
it preserves and enhances for individuals their ability to rationally 
consider and carry out their own decisions.”132 
 Unlike Dworkin, other authors support very intrusive paternalist 
policies in contract law.133 For instance, Duncan Kennedy argues that 
compulsory terms can cure “false consciousness,” which covers such 
differing things as underestimation of risk, augmentation of the dis-
count rate, unsupported confidence in others’ future behavior, and 
erroneous appreciation of long-term consequences of submissive rela-
tionships.134 Kennedy claims, “Courts using the doctrine of uncon-
scionability like to put their decisions on grounds of unequal bargain-
ing power . . . . But it’s often obvious that they are concerned not with 
power but with naïveté, or with lack of ability to make intelligent cal-
culations about what one can afford on one’s budget.”135 In these 
cases, “the decision maker has to take the beneficiary under his wing 
and tell him what he can and cannot do.”136 Kennedy portrays indi-
viduals in a way that is disrespectful of their autonomous agency. 
Analyzing mistakes made by small investors, he writes: 
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[E]veryone knew that what was really at work was greed, gullibil-
ity, incurable optimism, the gambler’s itch, the allure of something 
for nothing, all followed by addiction to the ticker, the secret diver-
sion of the family’s savings, the mortgaging of a small business, 
and then, when things turned down, increasing margin require-
ments, a desperate scramble to stay in the game just a little longer 
. . . ruin and a swan dive from a high window. What was going on 
in this fantasy drama of capitalism was not extortion. At worst, 
widows and orphans trust blindly in apparently upright advisors 
who turn out to be secret addicts themselves. It is a story of folly, 
not of duress. People are idiots.137 
 Because people are idiots—the argument runs—politicians must 
take paternalistic interventions to prevent them from damaging 
themselves. However, Kennedy’s view of citizens is at odds with a 
liberal view of personhood. As Seana Shiffrin says of paternalism in 
general, “[I]t directly expresses insufficient respect for the underlying 
valuable capacities, powers, and entitlements of the autonomous 
agent. Those who value equality and autonomy have special reason 
to resist paternalism toward competent adults.”138 This lack of re-
spect has a potential for political elitism. If people are idiots, why are 
they invested with the power to elect government officials? This is a 
disconcerting question for anyone committed to democracy. Intrusive 
paternalism threatens both individual and political autonomy.  
 Moreover, Kennedy’s recipe relies on a naïve model of paternalis-
tic policymaking. It assumes that politicians are less likely to commit 
mistakes than citizens. In fact, since politicians externalize a good 
deal of the costs of their mistakes, they are more likely to occur. Ken-
nedy also assumes that government positions tend to be occupied by 
altruists. Public choice theory suggests that this assumption is im-
plausible.139 Politicians are as self-interested as other people, because 
human rationality does not vary on social role.140  
 Paternalism has received new impetus from research in behav-
ioral decision theory.141 In fact, psychologists and experimental 
economists have studied some of the mistakes that Kennedy treats 
under the label of “false consciousness.” Behavioral decision theory 
assumes that these mistakes derive from cognitive mechanisms, 
rather than from capitalist alienation. Loss aversion, framing, hind-
sight, and other cognitive biases explain a number of mistakes that 
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people systematically commit in making judgments and decisions.142 
Because some of these irrational factors affect many contracting or 
consumer decisions, “behavioral law and economics” advocates pater-
nalist interventions in contract law, such as the striking down of on-
erous liquidated damages clauses and warranty disclaimers and the 
regulation of financial markets. 
 Behavioral paternalists opt for nonintrusive, noncoercive varieties 
of intervention. These varieties of paternalistic regulation are more 
congenial to the liberal motivation behind Dworkin’s own view. For 
instance, Cass Sunstein proposes “libertarian” paternalism, accord-
ing to which private and public organizations should establish ar-
rangements that influence people’s choices in ways that will further 
their interests but that nonetheless leave them free to opt out if they 
prefer to follow different strategies.143 “Libertarian paternalism” does 
not attempt to influence people’s behavior by blocking free choice. For 
instance, Sunstein recommends default rules.144 Similarly, Colin 
Camerer, among others, defend “asymmetric paternalism,” which 
promotes regulations that create benefits for those who do not act in 
their best interests because of errors that lead them astray, while let-
ting those who act in their best interests to do so without interfer-
ence.145 These authors say that “a policy is asymmetrically paternalis-
tic if it creates large benefits for those who are boundedly rational . . . 
while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational.”146 
Asymmetric paternalism has various applications in contract law. 
The defenders of this position mention as examples default rules, 
provision or re-framing of information (protection of credit consum-
ers, of investors, etc.), cooling-off periods, and limiting consumer 
choices (for example, deadlines to avoid procrastination). 
 There is little doubt that paternalism is one important motivation 
in labor law. Weak or nonintrusive paternalism can ground labor leg-
islation designed to protect workers from irrational choices that 
threaten them, particularly in times of harsh economic conditions. By 
the same token, unions can perform helpful functions in advising 
workers about their best strategies and choices in their negotiations 
with employers. Unlike Green’s moral freedom theory, the behavioral 
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economic approach does not offend free agency, because it relies on 
basic traits of all human beings. Thus, this approach does not express 
a moral elitist conception that underrates the capacities of laborers. 
In addition, the behavioral approach favors noncoercive measures 
that leave ample leeway for making employment contracts that fur-
ther workers’ reflective interests. In the last Part, I try to show that 
there also are moral grounds for nonprice compulsory terms in em-
ployment contracts (Farnam’s “protective legislation”). 
VI.   THE ARGUMENT FROM EQUAL AUTONOMY 
 In 1854, Abraham Lincoln replied to Southerners who claimed 
that “their slaves are better off than hired labourers amongst us.”147 
For Lincoln the great difference between slave labor and free labor is 
that, under the latter, “[t]he hired labourer of yesterday labours on 
his own account to-day, and will hire others to labour for him to-
morrow.”148 For Lincoln, “Advancement—improvement in condition—
is the order of things in a society of equals.”149 Ever since Lincoln un-
derstood a society of equals as a society of equal freedom and prosper-
ity, the contest over the meaning of equality has dominated American 
politics and law.  
 As I said earlier, labor law cannot be justified as a method of im-
plementing a Rawlsian conception of social equality. Is there any 
other conception of equality that can be realized through labor law? 
Post-Rawlsian egalitarian theories of justice have gravitated toward 
what Elizabeth Anderson has called “luck egalitarianism,” the doc-
trine that resource distribution should be choice-sensitive and luck-
insensitive.150 According to this doctrine, a fair scheme of resource al-
location should be insensitive to what Ronald Dworkin has called 
“brute luck,” that is, the contingencies of endowments, familiar back-
ground, and social position.151 However, luck egalitarianism incorpo-
rates an ideal of individual responsibility according to which people 
must internalize, as a matter of justice, the costs of their choices.152 
Accordingly, inequalities arising out of people’s choices for labor and 
leisure, for instance, are morally legitimate.153 A number of political 
philosophers who are critical of luck egalitarianism, like Elizabeth 
Anderson, Timothy Hinton, Samuel Scheffler, and Jonathon Wolff, 
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have recently worked out a different ideal of equality that Hinton 
calls “equality of status” and Anderson dubs “democratic equality.”154 
I prefer the name “equal autonomy,” as a way of indicating the doc-
trine’s origin in Kant. Anderson has sketched an articulation of this 
ideal: “In seeking the construction of a community of equals, democ-
ratic equality integrates principles of distribution with the expressive 
demands of equal respect.”155 For Anderson:  
The proper negative aim of egalitarian justice is not to eliminate 
the impact of brute luck from human affairs, but to end oppres-
sion, which by definition is socially imposed. Its proper positive 
aim is not to ensure that everyone gets what they morally deserve, 
but to create a community in which people stand in relations of 
equality to others.156 
 What are the labor-related implications of a community of equals? 
Equal autonomy endorses Kant’s ideal of an unconditional duty to re-
spect one’s own and others’ autonomy and dignity. Kantian respect is 
unconditional in that it cannot be overridden by anyone’s desire or 
preferences. Thus Anderson mentions Kant as opposing contracts 
into slavery or servitude.157 Interestingly, she fails to quote what 
Kant himself had to say about the labor relationship. In The Doctrine 
of Right, Kant claimed that the master must treat his servants as 
autonomous beings: 
[H]e can never behave as if he owned them (dominus servi); for it 
is only by a contract that he has brought them under his control, 
and a contract by which one party would completely renounce its 
freedom for the other’s advantage would be self-contradictory, that 
is, null and void, since by it one party would cease to be a person 
and so would have no duty to keep the contract but would recog-
nize only force.158 
It is not easy to derive concrete legal rules from Kant’s ideal of equal 
autonomy. However, Kant himself gives an example. He holds that 
the employment contract must be determined as to its quality and 
quantity to avoid being offensive to the worker’s autonomy: 
 Now it might seem that someone could put himself under obliga-
tion to another person, by a contract to let and hire (locatio con-
ductio), to perform services (in return for wages, board, or protec-
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tion) that are permissible in terms of their quality but indetermi-
nate in terms of their quantity, and that he thereby becomes just a 
subject (subiectus), not a bondsman (servus). But this is only a de-
ceptive appearance. For if the master is authorized to use the pow-
ers of his subject as he pleases, he can also exhaust them until his 
subject dies or is driven to despair (as with the Negroes on the 
sugar islands); his subject will in fact have given himself away, as 
property, to his master, which is impossible.—Someone can there-
fore hire himself out only for work that is determined as to its kind 
and its amount, either as a day laborer or as a subject living on his 
master’s property.159 
 While Kant embraced in general freedom of contract, he rejected 
contracts whereby people disclaim their equal worth and auton-
omy.160 These contracts he proposed to declare null and void.161 Ac-
cordingly, equal autonomy can justify nonprice regulations of the 
employment contract (that is, some forms of Farnam’s “protective leg-
islation”). In fact, those contract terms that offend equal autonomy 
cannot depend on market forces, because duties to respect equal 
autonomy are not subordinated to subjective preferences. Some non-
disclaimable labor rights are then a natural corollary of equal auton-
omy. Thus, there are areas of labor law, such as workers’ privacy 
rights, employment discrimination, health and safety conditions, and 
compensation for arbitrary discharge that seem central to the respect 
for individuals a society of equals should foster. The same holds of 
the prohibition of sexual and moral harassment at work, because the 
ban of a nonoppressive climate in workplace is essential to the re-
spect owed to autonomous individuals. Therefore, all these labor law 
institutions can be validated as institutional forms needed to secure 
the relevant nondisclaimable rights.162  
 Democratic egalitarians often rely on unsupported economic 
propositions to uphold price regulations and a variety of measures 
that tend to confiscate business property. For instance, Anderson de-
fends minimum wage laws and a qualified entitlement to work on the 
part of willing, able-bodied adults in order to eliminate all forms of 
status hierarchy, servitude, oppression, and exploitation.163 In trying 
to reply to obvious economic arguments against these measures, she 
speculates, “A minimum wage need not raise unemployment if low-
wage workers are given sufficient training to make them more pro-
ductive or if the higher wage induces employers to supply their work-
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ers with productivity-enhancing tools.”164 However, compelling em-
ployers to train low-productive workers could reduce the hiring of 
these workers. It is worth noting that Anderson did not feel obliged to 
give theoretical or empirical support for the hypothesis that mini-
mum wage/training laws do not increase unemployment. 
 In supporting labor rights, equal autonomy does not allow us to 
avoid serious economic analysis to assess the consequences of different 
policies. On the contrary, because law operates through complex 
causal mechanisms, we need economic analysis to ascertain whether a 
certain measure respects or violates equal autonomy. For instance, by 
resorting to serious economic analysis, we can know that, unless mo-
nopsonistic conditions are present, compulsory collective bargaining 
does not treat individuals as equals. On the one hand, this method of 
wage fixation does not allow workers to individually negotiate higher 
wage rates. On the other hand, collective bargaining harms the unem-
ployed to obtain higher wages for actual workers. Equal autonomy 
takes unemployment to be more offensive to human dignity than low 
wages. Because unionism often helps to raise wages to the detriment 
of the unemployed, it can be indefensible from the perspective of equal 
autonomy. By the same token, except in monopsonistic labor markets, 
minimum wage laws cannot be justified on the basis of equal auton-
omy. But this is not a general truth. Wages below the minimum could 
be more offensive to human dignity than unemployment if, for in-
stance, unemployment were alleviated by a social security regime. In 
such cases, maximum wage laws could be morally justified. In general, 
we need both moral judgment and economic analysis to assess the im-
pact of a given measure on equal autonomy.   
VII.   CONCLUSION 
 I have discussed five arguments for labor law, namely, the argu-
ment from positive freedom and real freedom, the argument from eq-
uity and social justice, the argument from noncommodification, the 
paternalistic argument, and the argument from equal autonomy. The 
argument from positive freedom has two variants: the argument from 
moral freedom and the argument from capabilities. The former has a 
potential for authoritarianism, and the latter is not associated to a 
discernible moral ideal. The arguments from real freedom and non-
commodification are excessively broad, because they lead to the over-
all rejection of capitalism when carried to their final conclusions. The 
argument from equity and social justice exposes a tension between 
bargaining equity and social justice; this tension should be resolved 
in favor of social justice. The arguments from paternalism and from 
                                                                                                                     
 164. Id. 
1148  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:1119 
 
equal autonomy offer the best possible defense of some labor law in-
stitutions. Libertarian or nonintrusive paternalism can justify non-
compulsory regulation of labor contracts that remedies so far as pos-
sible people’s propensities to commit mistakes in their contractual 
decisions. Finally, the argument from equal autonomy can justify 
nonprice compulsory terms in employment contracts that materialize 
the Kantian ideal of equal autonomy in labor settings. In fact, equal 
autonomy underlies most recent labor law developments in America 
and elsewhere, such as the prohibition of sexual and moral harass-
ment. It was also at the center of the liberal ideals that constituted 
this nation. 
 
